Mauser equipment transfer to Czechoslovakia post WW1 - for Paul.

bruce98k

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Here is an email segment from Jon: I have some most interesting matrials from All Mauser time periods and a the original Sales contract Between Mauser and the CZ folks in 1919 for the direct sale of all the Mauser machines,tools ,parts, guages with Signatures form Mauser and the CZ government and the Commison doc paid out to the lawyers who made the deal etc. In fact there was NO WAR reparation to the Czechs but a direct sale before the Treaty regs took affect in 1921. These docs will tell the unique story for the first time ever. I will send some pics later when I recover from the trip.

I will be adding data as it comes in. Jon visited with Lockhoven and came back with some very interesting material!

The cover shot is a Mauser report on the transfer and not the cover for the original business agreement.
 

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I agree this is a subject that is much misunderstood and that has a lot of misinformation. It is however a subject that you can find good information on, and I did just that about 2-3 years ago when researching the "1920 property marking" and started the work on Ludw. Loewe.

I think it was in one of Charles Kenyon's articles that I read something that opened my eyes to this misunderstanding regarding reparations. And from there I began researching the origins of the German rifle companies, how the 1919-1924 period effected them and how they worked through the rearmament programs implemented under Hitler's regime.

Much of that research has formed the foundation of my most recent articles.

A simple overview I posted a year or so ago on Gunboards gives the breakdown of what generally occurred after the end of WWI, and the thread goes into the creation and development of the Czech industries in particular. The thread is still quite accurate, however like with most things, new information comes in all the time:


http://forums.gunboards.com/showthread.php?185132

The arsenals didn't get sent anywhere, - they were rolled-over into state owned corporations (private fronts in some cases, but stock held by the government). The Entente allowed the various “Government owned” facilities to continue under certain circumstances (originally it was planned to close them all and destroy them), largely because of unemployment concerns-, which was, in part, fueling the unrest in Germany.

They were all de-militarized between 1920-1923, all war industries- whether private or state owned. To operate in post-Versailles Germany you had to go through an inspection and be certified, (some more rigorous than others- The previous State Arsenals were highly scrutinized and modified by the IAMCC. Krupp had in-house British supervision till 1926, long after everyone else). Essentially machines were classified into 3 categories, - machines of civilian use, machines of dual purpose and machines with only a military purpose.
Machines in the first class were kept in most cases, machines in the second class were allowed to an extent, depending on the firms planned production, those machines in excess of what the IAMCC thought practical were “usually” allowed to be sold to other firms- domestically and to other countries.
Machines in the last category were the real issue, in most cases the machines were destroyed under supervision of the IAMCC and sent to scrap facilities also monitored by the IAMCC.

The idea behind Versailles was not to distribute Germany’s war making ability throughout the world, making a hundred little Germany’s, but rather to create a lasting peace by destroying Germany’s war capability. (of course ideas and reality are two different things- for the most part Britain got what she wanted, most of the German equipment was destroyed rather than sold to countries friendly to France, which is what France wanted)
As for the cases where machines in the 3rd category were distributed by “reparations” or sold:

1. Before Versailles came into effect Mauser Oberndorf sold machines and parts to the Czechs, this was totally legal and went through (Czechs were never given reparations from Germany- during the war they were part of Austro-Hungarian Empire, hardly a victim of Germany- they did try to get “reparations” from Austria and Steyr with some success).

2. Simson was allowed to buy some machines from Erfurt, but no other sales were allowed besides a small ammunition sale to the Czechs.

3. As for “reparations” to Poland and the Arsenal at Danzig, - Poland received some machines from the old Danzig facility to start up Warsawa, but this was not “reparations” as Poland did not get reparations. Not even private property in Poland was lost to German companies. Poland did threaten nationalization of many “German owned” steel / mining companies but the German owned firms fought this off by a combination of inviting US companies to share ownership and taking on Polish management. Poland’s rifles came from many places (a hodgepodge really) facilities, depots in areas that passed from Germany to Poland, disarmed German soldiers in their area, and purchases from France, Belgium and the Dutch.

4. Yugoslavia was compensated for the destruction of their facilities by some machines from an unnamed State owned Arsenal (some say Spandau and this is most likely imo). Some say it was Mauser Oberndorf, and this is possible but not without compensation (they probably sent machines ordered by the Reichstreuhandgesellschaft but they would have been compensated by the government- possibly machines not available at Spandau who had really moved away from rifle production by 1918).

Generally private firms were not forced to pay reparations directly, - the German government was the only institution held liable for war damages, - the only exception being stolen machines and assets in Alsace-Lorraine, which I believe, had to be written off by the German steel/mining companies.

During the war the German Army seized machines in occupied territory (Belgium the largest victim), they then sold the machines to German companies and the IAMCC did not care what the circumstances were behind the theft/purchase.

The classic case was with DWM, they owned controlling stock at FN before the war. Once the German Army occupied FN, they refused to do war work, so the German Army sent the machines to Spandau. Where the machine gun tooling was used to expand MG08 production. They used FN’s rifle tooling as their part in the creation of WOK/Oberspree (it was joint venture- DWM and the government- typical of governments, they used stolen machines for their part, in this case stolen from their partner!). Late in the war DWM bought out the government, and when the war ended, Belgium demanded its machines back!

It didn’t matter that DWM actually owned a majority holding at FN, that they had purchased their own machines from the German government, - the machines had to be returned, and they were.

The only thing that could make it worse for DWM, was for the Belgian government to seize their stock holdings in FN. Guess what- they did!

Anyway, the Versailles treaty never really changed things fundamentally, the firms were all de-militarized and superficially altered, but not to an extent that would prevent their re-creation if that was desired. The simple fact is that the Entente couldn’t prevent, short of perpetual occupation, Germany re-arming eventually as Germany possessed the thing they couldn’t destroy.

A highly skilled work force, and the industrial base to manufacture in the US developed style of component assembly. This is what Germany did in WWII, they used a system based upon the US method- sub-contractors making components for weapon systems and assembled at firms designed for the purpose. (Gustloff Werke Weimar a perfect example of the “rings” at work).

The days of the huge State Arsenals were over, - the Eli Whitney, P&W, B&S, and L.Loewe revolution was here! – combined with banking of course…

Lastly, the MRJ has done articles on all the State Arsenals (Erfurt and Danzig will be re-done and expanded in the template used for Spandau & Amberg) and the next one up is on Ludwig Loewe & Co AG / DWM. It was the most challenging of them all but I think we will have it done by the next issue.
 
Here is an email segment from Jon: I have some most interesting matrials from All Mauser time periods and a the original Sales contract Between Mauser and the CZ folks in 1919 for the direct sale of all the Mauser machines,tools ,parts, guages with Signatures form Mauser and the CZ government and the Commison doc paid out to the lawyers who made the deal etc. In fact there was NO WAR reparation to the Czechs but a direct sale before the Treaty regs took affect in 1921. These docs will tell the unique story for the first time ever. I will send some pics later when I recover from the trip.

I will be adding data as it comes in. Jon visited with Lockhoven and came back with some very interesting material!

Hi Bruce,
Although's Jon documents are totally new, the entire story in some detail has been public for decades, having published in Czechoslovakia in 1969. The information appears in volume one of Otakar Franek's three volume economic history of Ceskoslovenska Zbrojovka Brno entitled "Dejiny Koncernu Brnenske Zbrojovky - Dil Prvni 1918-1939". The volume covers the establishment of the firm up to the Nazi takeover in 1939. (Separate volumes address export arms contracts and the war years. A 4th volume by different authors covers the postwar years to 1960.)

Colonel Sada's book "Czechoslovak Rifles and Machineguns" (1971) also describes the Brno-Mauser Oberndorf relationship, although in broader detail, it is available in English. (This is the book that was translated by the US Army in 1973 and has been floating around for years in xerox form.) The early years 1919-1922 of the Mauser-Brno relationship are not described in the detail that Franek goes into, but Sada does have a very interesting discussion of the Gewehr 98 technical/manufacturing drawing package that Brno bought from Oberndorf, knowing full well that Oberndorf Gewehr 98 components were not fully interchangeable. Sada also notes that between 1923 and 1925, Brno had to buy a second round of tooling to replace the Mauser Oberndorf tooling in order to precision manufacture interchangeable Mauser rifle components. Interesting stuff, especially the fact that the Oberndorf tooling did not yeild a high degree of component interchangeablity.

It was not until 1925 or 1926 that Brno had completely retooled again and completely redone their drawings and procedures with precision manaufacturing machines that it was able to fabricate a rifle (the Vz.24) that had 90%-95% reliably interchangeable components.

Knowing that Mauser was subsidiary of Ludwig Loewe, one of Germany's greatest proponents of the American system of precision manufacturing, it was a surprise to read that the Oberndorf Gewehr 98 was not regarded as an interchangeable rifle. Then I recall that several years ago, Jon told me that DWM engineers were not permitted on the factory floor at Oberndorf...and it all began to make sense.

Another interesting thing about Sada is that he puts Czechoslovak arrms history in a larger context than just Mauser Oberndorf relationship. Several of the most interesting parts are his discussions of the 13,000 M93 8 m/m Austrian conversions of the German Commission Gewehr 88's in Czechoslovak service; the Gewehr 88 chambered for a shotgun cartridge for guard use; and the purchase of large number of Gewehr 98's and Kar 98's from France, the Netherlands and what Sada calls the "Bavarian block". Given the time and place, the "Bavarian block" can only have been the Einwohnerwehr Bayern rifles collected from EWB troops in the early 1920's. These were later sold by the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defense to Yugoslavia, and no doubt account for the large number of EWB-branded rifles imported by Century from Albania in the early 1990's.

By the way, Sada indicates that tooling for Brno came from not only Mauser, but DWM, another firm in Wurttemburg and Cinncinati Ohio, to name a few.

Best Regards,
John
 
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Current Thread

Thanks for all the input guys. Jons original intent was to get copies of the original agreement
between Mauser and the Ministry of National Defense out for viewing.

I will be posting these as soon as I can photoshop them.

Most collectors have no idea of the nuances of the post-WW1 agreement between Mauser and both Yugoslovia and Czechoslovakia. I for one did not know the extent of these dealings
until I began researching this project, in part for some background on another chapter, and not the Mauser chapter.

Paul was timely in his repost of his background data on that subject and I appreciate it.

I also have copies of the original Mauser records showing the inventory and value of the items transferred to Yugoslovia as well.
If requested I will post that data as well.

Jon had just received the translated copy of Sada's book from Lockhoven this last week.

From excerpts from a section of that text, equipment was also transferred from the firms of Hahn and Kolb and A.H.Schutte.

I have also added the first two segments (pages) that Jon sent over and the segment from Sada's text covering the transfer.
 
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Good Info

You have alot of good information already in this thread, thanks for sharing. I always enjoy Pauls replies, more GOOD info. I'm glad you haven't saved it all for the new book. It's much easier to remember if you get it a little time. I can't tell you how many times I re-read threads.
 
Welcome John! I am very pleased that you made it over here and have contributed to this topic!

I will break my post down in sperate parts as it covers a lot of ground and is confusing altogether:

I agree it is rather odd that the German firms never reached the full potential of interchangeable parts manufacture, they were certainly capable of it, but I think it was a combination of several factors, not the least of which was the high level of skilled labor and powerful labor organizations (Storz covers this in regards to rifles, but it applied to many industries) which resisted many of the rationalization efforts. Germany was also quite different in its outlook in machinery and machine tool production, especially in the late interwar period when any such modernization would have been undertaken. (more later)

Besides being no demand for such interchangeable parts machinery in rifle production (none were engaged in mass production or could have expected to be anytime soon), due to the restrictions on foreign arms sales, the few small arms firms were critically short of capital for such investment. Such machinery is very expensive, especially for the most efficient machines that were often used for a single part or task (which means you need a lot of expensive single purpose machines The list of machines used at Springfield Armory in 1938 was as long as your arm).

For such capital expenditure, especially in tough times, you would have to see a future in such machines. Germany in 1924-1929 was not a good place for such a venture. Though the IAMCC was long gone, one of the main impediments to small arms manufacture in Germany was German law itself. Which to settle some of the conflict with France and Britain, shortly after the IAMCC pulled out in 1927, Germany passed a law to stop sale and export of military arms. This ended a long held demand, by France in particular, and shows the general theme of why reparations never meant sending machines or arms to other countries seeking to rearm. Further the general attitude of the German governments 1919-1929 which tended to be left-center governments, with strong socialist elements, made such purchases, in anticipation of domestic arms sale to the military very unlikely (it wasn’t so much Versailles as much as a cheap government – disarmament was less about rifles and small arms than airplanes, submarines, artillery, machine guns and capacity for offensive war. The German Army could have bought new rifles at any time but they were starved of funds, they couldn’t even fully upgrade to Kar98b!).

Re-armament and military spending was not a high priority generally for any German government and even Hitler proceeded rather slowly in this regard, focusing on the basics and foundation of rearmament early on.
 
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Germany's machine tool industry 1929-1945

Regarding machine tools and the machine tool industry in Germany during this period, it had changed radically between 1928 and 1939.

By 1929 88% of German machinery production was exported, mostly to the Soviet Union, who had always been one of Germany's biggest customers (Imperial Russia and Soviet Russia).
By 1933 the machine tool industry employment had declined by 50% in Germany (employment being the number one issue at the time – even Hitler feared unemployment) and those that had work were working reduced hours. Even under Hitler’s rearmament plans the machine tool industry lagged in recovery, largely ignored and when it recovered it never was quite the same. It always had excess capacity, even as late as 1944 it was one of the key sectors that was still half stepping and really not exceptional by British and US standards.

The emphasis in German wartime machine tools (WWII) was one of making general-purpose machines. This is contrary to how it had been done in both Germany and the United States early on, which though German firms were less focused on special purpose machines than those in the US, they were the United States main competitor in export sales (no foreign firm really competed within the US market 1850-1945).
 
Special purpose machines & efficiency

The general theme is that US machine tool companies specialized, and had for many years, it was the main reason why the US had been a leader in the industry since the 1850's. US firms made machines that specialized (special purpose), machines that were designed to make one part, and that generally isn’t suitable to make other parts, these machines have a very high output, much higher than general-purpose machine tools, and more than compensates for the lack of versatility when mass production is desired.

Of course if your customer base is not for mass production, or your sales are diverse- many German firms were very personalized and catered to supplying full service needs- a general purpose machine is more practical, it is more versatile but has much less capacity- more labor costs (labor in the US has long been a problem that firms worked around by machine efficiency – it was a driving force behind many developments. It only became unsolvable when government took the part of labor and has made business increasingly impractical domestically).
Struggling German firms found that general purpose machines were more suitable to the current system during the depression and the German (nazi) government and it’s approach to business did not encourage a change in this practice- profit was taken out of business efficiency and discouraged capital investment, - they did give certain industries tax incentives to (and high taxes on profit taking to encourage rolling over profit in capital goods) upgrade infrastructure, but efficiency was not encouraged until 1942-43 and specialized machine tools (key to efficiency) were not encouraged until late in the war.

During the war (WWII) the German machine tool industry was treated very differently than in the US, where the machine tool industry was given incredible government support (funds and resource allocation- all countries, US, Britain & Germany controlled raw materials and companies were strictly controlled through this method- in Germany it went further of course but the difference was akin to slavery vs. indentured servitude. You made what you were told or went out of business, naturally most firms cooperated without coercion but you could not operate at all if you were not in step with government programs- your production determined when & if you received resources) whilst in Germany the industry was incredibly neglected.
Skilled labor high jacked to other armament production, shorter working hours compared to other sectors, lack of raw materials... only late under Speer did this change at all and even then nothing like the importance machine tools held in the US and Britain. (In the US many general machinery firms went to making machine tools, in Germany this was reversed, and many went to straight munitions work were resource allocation - steel & labor - and profits were higher)

German machine tool production peaked in 1941, and dropped appreciable thereafter, almost by a 1/3 by wars end (1944 last year figures available and bombing had little to do with it) - in the United States 1943 was the peak year, nearly double Germany's peak.
 
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As John points out, Ludw. Loewe was one of Germany’s leading machine tool firms, and a great proponent of the US style of manufacturing. It’s entire program was designed around the theory, and when they built their massive Hüttenstraße facility they based it upon developments learned in the US and outfitted it with mostly American made machines (To many Englishmen’s surprise they bought only one machine tool designed by a English firm, the rest were American made! Made news at the time…especially in English circles). Their motto was even based upon the American premise, - "Das Beste ist das Billigste" which with help from German speakers, using the full context of the application, means “best is cheapest” in the respect of lowest costs, highest efficiency and value for the money. Which is exactly the principle of the American System at work.

To expand upon John Wall's observation DWM-Mauser access, in the machine tool industry machine, tool designers were rarely consulted on munitions designs and not until 1943 were they admitted to munitions plants! This is in total contrast to the US and Britain, where before a design would be completed, its machine tooling designs were significantly considered and adjustments made to make the product more efficiently (machine tool friendly).

Knowing that Mauser was subsidiary of Ludwig Loewe, one of Germany's greatest proponents of the American system of precision manufacturing, it was a surprise to read that the Oberndorf Gewehr 98 was not regarded as an interchangeable rifle. Then I recall that several years ago, Jon told me that DWM engineers were not permitted on the factory floor at Oberndorf...and it all began to make sense.
 
Thanks, - like most anything, given enough time what you write becomes dated, especially with the internet and the forums changing what we know almost daily. Sometimes when I search out an old thread, or past article, I am shocked by how inaccurate they are and can't read the whole thing!

If you go back just a few years it can get a little embarrassing reading what your wrote.

You have alot of good information already in this thread, thanks for sharing. I always enjoy Pauls replies, more GOOD info. I'm glad you haven't saved it all for the new book. It's much easier to remember if you get it a little time. I can't tell you how many times I re-read threads.
 
info

We try and put as much stuff out there as possible given my limited time. Mike is ramped up now and both of us are
working to try and assemble a first class product, one of which we hope outclasses our first work. From all indications
and with Jon and Lockhoven really being part of our working group, it is looking good.

Most of you guys dont know who Lockhoven is but for one, he co-wrote the now classic Interarms 2-volume set
International Armament. As time permits, Jon Speed visits with Hans and comes back with a treasure trove of historical
data and archival material that was in Lockhovens extensive library.

The original set of the sales agreement between Mauser and the Czechs was one of the gems he brought back.
 
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